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Social Networking: The Application of 
the Data Protection Framework 
Revisited  
REBECCA WONG* 
This article will revisit the social media issues in the context 
of the Data Protection legislative framework and the extent 
to which the notion of ‘data controller’ could extend to 
individuals. The main contribution is that the discussion will 
add to the debate on the blurring of the distinctions drawn 
between public and private spheres and whether what is 
published on social media should be deemed to be private or 
in the public domain. This paper will revisit the concept of 
‘data controller’ in the context of social media and consider 
the extent to which users are entitled to the ‘privacy’ of data 
they share on a social media platform. It will also cover some 
of the forthcoming changes introduced under the proposed 
Data Protection Regulation including the ‘right to be 
forgotten’.  
Introduction  
In 2007,1 I examined the emerging development of social media in 
the context of the data protection legislative framework and the 
extent to which the notion of ‘data controller’ could extend to 
individuals. In other words, the application of the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC (DPD) could apply to individuals for posting 
information about others on social media such as Facebook. 
Although the data protection framework did not envisage extending 
                                            
* Senior Lecturer, Nottingham Law School (email: r.wong@ntu.ac.uk). 
1 Rebecca Wong, ‘Social Networking: A Conceptual Analysis of a Data Controller’ 
(2009) 14 Communications Law 142. Original working paper: ‘Social Networking: 
Anybody is a Data Controller’ (2008) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271668> accessed 28 August 
2014. 
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its breadth, the Art. 29 Working Party on data protection published 
an opinion making it clear that users would only be responsible in so 
far that it goes beyond the private purposes category such as acting 
on behalf of a company or association or using the social networking 
site to promote charitable or political aims.2 
This paper will revisit some of these issues and consider whether 
there have been any significant developments since then. For the 
purposes of this study, this paper will consider the legal frameworks 
in the UK, Germany Sweden, and to a limited extent, Norway.  
Background 
The main statutory provision that deals with the application of the 
DPD is Art. 4—application of the directive. This provides that Art. 
4(1)(a) of the DPD and corresponding national laws implementing 
the DPD apply to activities of an establishment of the controller on 
the territory of the European Union member state, or where the data 
controller had used equipment to process the data of an individual, 
thus falling within the scope of Art. 4(1)(c). To exemplify this, 
consider the example of MySpace, whom has its headquarters in and 
is domiciled in California. This means that the DPD would not be 
applicable. However, if they process or use equipment within a 
member state of the EU, then they could be deemed to be processing 
personal data and thus fall within the scope of the DPD.3 The 
question that then arises is, who is the data controller in this 
scenario? MySpace or its users? First, MySpace if it processes data of 
its users. The complexity then arises when users use data belonging 
to other users—who owns this data? For instance, a photograph may 
be more difficult to ascertain. Who owns the photograph? The 
                                            
2 Art. 29 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social Networking (WP 
163, 2009) para 3.1.1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf> 
accessed 14 November 2014. 
3 This is likely to change under the forthcoming Data Protection Regulation which 
provides that the Regulation will apply where the processing of activities are 
related to (a) the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in the Union or 
(b) the monitoring of their behaviour (Art. 3). 
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Copyright, Designs and Patents Act would indicate that it was the 
photographer who owns the photograph. The DPD, however, places 
responsibility on the data controller to ensure that any processing of 
personal information is carried out in accordance with the DPD.  
It was originally thought that the DPD would not apply to a social 
networking site (SNS) environment given its historical background 
and the opinions of the Data Protection Commissioners. However, 
the Art. 29 Working Party, responsible for providing guidance on 
the application of the data protection laws decided in 2009 (by 
issuing an opinion to that effect)4 that the household exemption 
under Art. 3 of the DPD applies and therefore SNS users would not 
be considered to be data controllers unless they fall under narrow 
exceptions where activities were used to promote charitable or 
political aims. According to the Art. 29 Working Party, if the SNS 
user acts on behalf of a company or association or uses the SNS to 
promote commercial, political or charitable goals, Art. 3 exception 
would not apply as it would go beyond the definition of personal or 
household exemption.5 It was further acknowledged by the Art. 29 
Working Party that even if Art. 3 exception did not apply, the other 
exception under Art. 9 of the DPD—journalistic, artistic and literary 
purposes—may apply.6 SNS and application providers, however, 
within a SNS environment would be considered to be ‘data 
controllers’ under the DPD. Perhaps, the main difficulty is being able 
to draw a clear boundary between individuals acting in their private 
capacity and those who adopt additional roles which may go beyond 
the private use exception in a SNS environment. It could be argued 
that private use is becoming more difficult for users who have two 
roles both in their professional and private capacity and that 
therefore, this provision becomes unworkable in practice. A further 
note to add is that the Art. 29 Working Party does not hold the view 
that images are unlikely to be sensitive data unless the data reveals 
sensitive data about the individuals.7 It does, however, take the view 
                                            
4 Art. 29 Working Party (n 2). 
5 ibid 6. 
6 ibid.  
7 ibid. 
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that sensitive personal data8 may be published with the express 
consent of the individual.  
UK  
The main provision that deals with the exception is s. 36 of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. Although it has slightly different wording from 
the DPD, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) has taken 
the view that social networking falls outside the scope of the UK 
DPA 1998. In 2007, there were relatively few complaints made 
against social networks9 and it was not clear whether this could be 
due to the slow progress by SNS users or rather the mechanisms of 
complaints were easily resolved. 
The case of Applause Stores Production and Firsht v Raphael10 was 
the first case in the UK dealing with SNS and a fictitious profile. This 
was based primarily on a defamation claim and concerned an 
individual businessman who had found that the defendant (D) had 
posted a fake profile of the claimant and made defamatory remarks 
concerning his creditworthiness and his company on Facebook. This 
led to a court action resulting in an award for damages of £15,000 
in libel damages and £2,000 for privacy damages.  
In Bryce v Barber11 the High Court had ruled that the claimant was 
entitled to damages of £10,000 for defamatory material posted on 
his Facebook profile, including an accusation that the claimant was a 
paedophile. Indeed, Rider argued that the widespread use and 
                                            
8 Sensitive data is defined as ‘data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership or data 
concerning health or sex life’. 
9 Wong (n 1). 
10 [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB).  
11 Bryce v Barber (HC, 27 July 2010) unreported. See Deborah Rider, ‘Social 
Networks: Bryce v Barber’ (2010) 10(4) E-Commerce Law Reports 12-13. See also 
Ashley Hurst, ‘Social Media and Reputation: When to Take Legal Action’ 
(Olswang, 25 November 2010) and The Telegraph, ‘Law Student Wins £10,000 
after Being Branded a Paedophile on Facebook’ The Telegraph (28 July 2010) 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/7912731/Law-student-wins-10000-
after-being-branded-a-paedophile-on-Facebook.html> accessed 14 November 2014. 
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availability of material posted on the internet could influence the 
amount of damages awarded by the courts.12 Although this case was 
based on defamation, it could be argued that the information held 
on Facebook was inaccurate and could have been easily removed if a 
request was made directly to Facebook. However, this case does 
highlight the problems that may exist in an SNS with users posting 
information about others (X) which may portray them (X) in a 
different light.  
In J19 v Facebook Ireland,13 an interim injunction was discharged 
against Facebook for being imprecise and unclear and placed a 
disproportionate burden on Facebook to monitor all the content on 
the web pages it hosted. Facebook had published photographs and 
information about J without his permission describing J as a 
‘sectarian parade organiser’ and a ‘loyalist bigot’. Members of the 
public added further threatening comments on the website. An 
interim injunction was granted preventing Facebook from placing on 
its website photos of J, his name, address and personal details. 
Facebook removed the data and appealed successfully against the 
injunction. The court held that the injunction was not precise and J 
could seek further remedies from the court. There was insufficient 
evidence that J could establish a breach of Art. 2 ECHR. What this 
case indicates, however, is the relative ease with which information 
can be posted on Facebook. Although the claimant had used legal 
remedies (not under the DPA 1998) to remove this information, it 
further highlighted the need for SNS such as Facebook to act swiftly 
in removing information that is likely to be defamatory of an 
individual or reveal private information about an individual before it 
gets out of hand. 
In July 2014,14 the author requested information on the number of 
complaints that were made against SNS such as Facebook, Google, 
LinkedIn, Pipl, etc. Although the cases recorded date back to 2012, 
their enormous number (exceeding 100 since 2012) meant that it 
was not possible to evaluate all the data and, therefore, the statistics 
                                            
12 ibid (Rider). 
13 [2013] NIQB 113. 
14 Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request to the ICO (18 July 2014) 
(correspondence on file with the author). 
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date from 2014, the current year.15 It should also be added that 
complaints raised were not only on the above complainants but 
included other organisations. The cases were categorised according 
the specific sector (‘internet’, ‘retail’, ‘media’, ‘general’). Therefore, 
only cases dating since April 2014 were considered.  
ICO  
Organisations (April 2014 –August 2014) 
Google    6 
Facebook   4 
LinkedIn    0  
Pipl   0 
Twitter   0 
Other    67 
As indicated above, the legal cases against social media have been 
very few, despite the focus in the academic literature.16 However, 
when considering the concept of breach of privacy, the misuse of 
personal information or the law of confidence is used rather than the 
Data Protection Act 1998, where a direct complaint before the UK 
Information Commissioner or the rights provided under the UK DPA 
1998 would be appropriate. 
Finally, there is one further point to add in relation to the private 
purposes exemption. In response to the forthcoming Data Protection 
Regulation,17 and in particular Art. 2 (material scope) on ‘processing 
                                            
15 The number refers to the number of complaints made, but not whether there were 
valid grounds or the types of queries referred to. 
16 This is not an exhaustive list, but see Amedeo F Cappuccio, ‘The Private Nature 
of Information’ [2014] 2 IPQ 159 and Nicole A Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: 
Physical Privacy in English Law’ (2014) 73 CLJ 350—this is not to suggest that the 
privacy is not relevant, but that data protection is not considered or examined.  
17 ICO, Proposed New EU General Data Protection Regulation: Article by Article 
Analysis Paper (12 February 2013) 
<http://ico.org.uk/news/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Research_and_
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by a natural person without any gainful interest in the course of its 
own exclusively personal or household activity’, the ICO took the 
view that in some contexts processing personal data for gainful 
interest could still be in the course of a person’s exclusively personal 
or household activity, such as setting up a website to sell unwanted 
birthday presents.18 According to the ICO, wording such as ‘in 
pursuit of a commercial objective’ could be non-personal.19 The ICO 
further added that they did not agree with the Lindqvist decision,20 
but accepted that open publication of personal data may be a 
contributing factor when deciding whether or not the processing was 
done for personal or household purposes. The ICO preferred clearer 
guidelines from the law and found that it was becoming more 
difficult to decide whether processing was done for personal or 
household purposes.21  
The ICO’s position therefore highlights the problems with applying 
the personal or household purposes exception and the level of 
disagreement with the Lindqvist decision. It is not certain how the 
personal or household purposes will apply in practice after the Data 
Protection Regulation is passed, but it indicates some reservations 
which need to be cleared, if there is to be any user confidence and 
certainty in the Data Protection Regulation whether online or not. 
Germany 
In Germany, the Federal Data Protection Act 2009 (BDSG)22 governs 
the processing of personal data by private bodies and federal public 
                                                                                                   
reports/ico_proposed_dp_regulation_analysis_paper_20130212_pdf.ashx> accessed 
14 November 2014. 
18 ibid 3. 
19 ibid 4. 
20 Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist v Kammaråklagaren (Public Prosecutor), 
Jönköpning (OJ C 118, 24 April 2001). 
21 ibid.  
22 Took effect from 1 September 2009, s 1(2) of the Federal Data Protection Act 
2009 (BDSG) outlines the scope—public bodies of the Federation; public bodies of 
the Lander (state) where it is not covered by Lander bodies; federal law or act as 
judiciary bodies and administrative matters are not involved and private bodies. 
(The full text of the BDSG is available at 
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bodies whilst each state’s data protection laws (‘Länder’) govern the 
processing of personal data by state bodies.23 The German Telemedia 
Act 2007 applies to data processed in the context of online activities. 
The view of the Berlin Data Protection Commissioner in 2007 was 
that whether SNS users would qualify as ‘data controllers’ depended 
on the degree to which the data could be accessible to others. For 
instance, a photo album held on the server of social network provide 
accessible only to a subscriber would benefit from the exemption for 
‘purely personal or household activities’.24  
The Art. 29 Working Party has since published an opinion on social 
networking sites and how the DPD applies. 25  While some 
developments have emerged since 2007, it is important to consider 
the opinion noted above. For example, the opinion outlines when the 
household exception would apply and addresses the issue of sensitive 
data as applied to the data protection framework26 
                                                                                                   
<www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/BDSG_idFv01092009.pdf?__b
lob=publicationFile> accessed 14 November 2014). See Jörg Hladjk, ‘Changes to 
German Data Protection Law’ (2010) 10(5) Privacy and Data Protection 10; Jones 
Day, ‘Germany Strengthens Data Protection Act, Introduces Data Breach 
Notification’ Jones Day (October 2009) 
<www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/943821c6-517f-495f-a753-
a2a5e2c519cd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7917f187-78e1-487f-b00e-
a519e5a22c23/Germany%20Strengthens%20Data.pdf> accessed 14 November 
2014. See also: Privacy International, ‘Germany: Legal Framework’ (Privacy 
International, October 2010) <www.privacyinternational.org/reports/germany/i-
legal-framework> accessed 14 November 2014. 
23 For an in-depth study into the German Federal Data Protection Act, see Anne-
Marie Zell, ‘Data Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany and the European 
Union: An Unequal Playing Field’ (2014) 15(3) German Law Journal 461; David 
Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sweden, France, Canada and the United States (UNC Press 1992); Spiros 
Simitis, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (7th edn, Nomos 2011 (in German)); Christopher 
Klug, ‘Book Review: Spiros Simitis, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz’ (2012) 2(2) 
International Data Privacy Law 113. 
24 Wong (n 1), and also Daniel B Garrie and others, ‘Data Protection: The 
Challenges Facing Social Networking’ (2010) 6 Brigham International Law and 
Management Review 127, 138. 
25 Art. 29 Working Party (n 2). 
26 ibid. 
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In 2008, the German Federal Commissioner of Berlin, co-sponsored 
by other Data Protection Authorities27 issued an opinion on privacy 
protection on social networking sites, making several 
recommendations.28 The main recommendations were: that social 
networking sites should respect privacy standards where they 
operate their services; users should be informed of the processing of 
their personal information on an SNS; users should be given control 
over their SNS profile; privacy friendly default settings should be 
provided to users; security standards should be adhered to by SNS 
providers; users should be given access and the option to delete their 
user profile; users should be given the option to use pseudonyms; 
providers should ensure that third parties to do not bulk download 
of user’s data; and user’s data should not be accessible on search 
engines without the user’s express and informed consent. 
In 2009, the German Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information, Peter Schaar, took the view that social 
networking sites were poorly protected by privacy policies and that 
they were not onboard with protecting user’s data. 29  He 
recommended that an independent consumer agency should be 
created to evaluate social networks and give grades on their privacy 
policies, letting users know which SNS protects them best.  
Very recently, in 2013, the Schleswig-Holstein Privacy 
Commissioner30 outlined some of the challenges surrounding social 
                                            
27 The co-sponsors were the French CNIL, Italian Data Protection Authority, Dutch 
Data Protection Authority, New Zealand Privacy Commissioner and Swiss Federal 
Data Protection Commissioner. 
28 30th International Conference on Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, 
‘Resolution on Privacy Protection in Social Network Services’ (BfDI, 17 October 
2008) 
<www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/EN/InternationalDS/2008SocialNet
work.pdf?__blob=publicationFile> accessed 25 August 2014. 
29 Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, ‘Data 
Protection Commissioner Warns over Social Networking Sites’ (BfDI, 4 January 
2010) 
<www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/PublicRelations/SpeechesAndInterviews/Artikel/271209Art
ikelDeutscheWelle.html> accessed 25 August 2014. 
30 Thilo Weichert, ‘Current Data Protection Challenges in Social Networks’ 
(Datenschutz Zentrum, 19 November 2013) 
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networks and privacy arising from complaints about Google and 
Facebook and the application of German data protection laws, 
which are described below.31  
In 2012, an informal group (‘Dusseldorf Circle’) of Data Protection 
Authorities within Germany examined the application of data 
protection laws to SNSs in Germany.32 Although the resolution was 
not binding, it gave an insight on how German data protection laws 
would apply. According to Niemann, the application of German 
data protection laws to social networking sites had been quite 
controversial.33 Providers outside the European Economic Area (EEA) 
were subject to the German data protection laws where personal 
data was collected by accessing users’ data on computers in 
Germany. The German data protection laws would still apply to 
organisations unless it can be shown that it was established in a 
different country within the EEA. It emphasised that organisations 
could not circumvent the data protection rules by setting up an 
establishment in another EEA country, so some control over the SNS 
within the establishment had to be shown if it were to fall outside of 
German data protection rules. The German data protection rules 
continue to apply to organisations where data processing took place 
outside the EEA but where one EEA establishment could be 
identified as a data controller. The Dusseldorf Circle further pointed 
                                                                                                   
<www.datenschutzzentrum.de/vortraege/20131119-weichert-data-protection-
social-networks.html> accessed 14 November 2014. 
31 ibid. 
32 Fabirn Niemann, ‘German Data Protection Authorities Broaden Application of 
German Data Protection Law to Foreign Social Networks and Attack the Use of 
Social Plugins and Fanpages’ (Mondaq, 17 April 2012) 
<www.mondaq.com/x/170870/Social+Media/German+Data+Protection+Authoritie
s+Broaden+Application+Of+German> accessed 14 November 2014; German 
Federal Data Protection Commissioner, ‘Social Networking Resolution’ (BfDI, 8 
December 2011) 
<www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Entschliessungssammlung/Duesseld
orferKreis/08122011DSInSozialenNetzwerken.html?nn=409242> accessed 25 
August 2014. (See more on the Dusseldorf Group at 
<www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Entschliessungen/entschlie%C3%9Fungen_node.html> 
accessed 25 August 2014, and the Dusseldorf Group Resolutions at 
<www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Entschliessungen/DuesseldorferKreis/DKreis_node.html> 
accessed 25 August 2014. 
33 ibid (Niemann). 
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out that the use of social plugins (on sites such as Facebook and 
Google) or fanpages were responsible for safeguarding user’s privacy. 
In particular, social plugins by German website providers would be 
illegal where they triggered the transfer of personal data to an SNS 
provider. Consent was required from the user before data could be 
collected using a social plugin. German websites should ensure they 
have knowledge of the use of social plugins in order to inform their 
users. Otherwise, the Dusseldorf Circle discourages the use of social 
plugins by German websites.34 Although the scale of social plugin 
use on websites is generally unknown,35 it is quite clear that there is 
some reservation expressed by the German Data Protection 
Authorities on the potential harm that can be caused by the transfer 
of personal data from websites onto SNS using this plugins. 
In two separate legal developments the subject of Facebook was once 
again raised, primarily on the application of German data protection 
law and the extent to which users’ data are protected in Germany.  
The court in Schleswig-Holstein held that German data protection 
laws did not apply to Facebook because its headquarters were in 
Ireland.36 The case concerned a decision by the Schleswig-Holstein 
Data Protection Authority (ULD), when it issued its policy against 
Facebook for not allowing users to use pseudonyms on the social 
                                            
34 ibid.  
35 Facebook, ‘Social Plugins and Your Privacy’ <https://en-
gb.facebook.com/help/340599879348142/> accessed 25 August 2014. 
36 Carlo Piltz, ‘Facebook Ireland Ltd/Facebook Inc v Independent Data Protection 
Authority of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany—Facebook is Not Subject to German 
Data Protection Law’ (2013) 3(3) International Data Privacy Law 210; Schleswig-
Holstein Data Protection Authority, ‘OVG Schleswig-Holstein: For Facebook, 
German Data Protection Laws Do Not Apply’ (Datenschutz Zentrum, 24 March 
2013) <www.datenschutzzentrum.de/presse/20130424-facebook-klarnamen-ovg-
en.htm> accessed 14 November 2014; Natasha Lomas, ‘Facebook Wins Court 
Challenge in Germany Against Its Real Name Policy’ (TechCrunch, 15 February 
2013) <http://techcrunch.com/2013/02/15/facebook-wins-court-challenge-in-
germany-against-its-real-names-policy/> accessed 14 November 2014; Louise 
Osborne, ‘German State Fights Facebook over Alleged Privacy Violations’ The 
Guardian (London, 4 January 2013) 
<www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/04/facebook-germany-data-protection> 
accessed 14 November 2014. 
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networking site based on s. 13(6) of the Telemedia Act,37 contending 
that it eroded user’s online freedom. 
By contrast, the High Court of Berlin ruled in 2014 that Facebook 
was subject to data protection laws. In this case, the German 
Consumer Organisation (VZBV) had brought a claim against 
Facebook for breaching German consumer laws by sending emails 
without user’s consent.38 The tool used was the Facebook ‘Friend 
Finder’. Users who agreed with Facebook terms and conditions 
would give permission to Facebook search through contact details 
and send user’s friends invites, if they had not registered with 
Facebook. Agreeing with the terms and conditions also meant that 
the data could be shared with third parties. The High Court of Berlin 
held that users were not informed. Facebook had not complied with 
the data protection laws when using non-user’s data to distribute 
advertising material.39 The key issue was whether German laws 
applied or whether the Irish Data Protection law applied. According 
to the Berlin Court, Facebook—an American based business—was 
responsible for the processing and there was very little evidence 
provided that the data was being handled by the Irish headquarters. 
                                            
37 s 13(6) of the German Telemedia Act states that providers of Telemedia Services 
(including websites) are required to provide users with the opportunity to remain 
anonymous or use a pseudonym while using a regulated service. For further 
analysis, see Marcus Schreibauer and Jan Spittka, ‘German Court Holds Presence 
of Irish Subsidiary Precludes Application of German Data Protection Law to 
Facebook’ (Hogan Lovells, 1 March 2013) 
<www.hldataprotection.com/2013/03/articles/consumer-privacy/german-court-
holds-presence-of-irish-subsidiary-precludes-application-of-german-data-
protection-law-to-facebook/> accessed 14 November 2014; Henning Krieg, 
‘German Telemedia Act Introduces New Rules for New Media’ (Bird & Bird, 5 
March 2007) <www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2007/german-tele-media-act-
new-rules> accessed 14 November 2014; and Centre for German Legal 
Information, ‘German Telemedia Act 2007 (English Translation)’ (CGerLI, 26 
February 2007) 
<www.cgerli.org/fileadmin/user_upload/interne_Dokumente/Legislation/Telemedia
_Act__TMA_.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014. 
38 Out-Law News, ‘Facebook Subject to Data Protection Rules, says Berlin Court’ 
(Out-Law News, 26 February 2014) <www.out-
law.com/en/articles/2014/february/facebook-subject-to-german-data-protection-
rules-says-berlin-court/> accessed 14 November 2014. 
39 ibid. 
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It centred on the application of Art. 4(1)(c) whereby if equipment 
was used in Germany, then it would fall within the German Federal 
Data Protection Act. Cookies were installed on the devices of 
German users and, therefore, the Berlin Court held that the German 
Federal Data Protection Act applied. It is not clear whether an 
appeal would be lodged before the German Supreme Court.40  
Finally, one further legal development is a further appeal which was 
decided on the 4th September by the German Administrative court by 
the Schleswig-Holstein Data Protection Authority against Facebook 
on the use of pseudonyms following the Berlin Court ruling. The 
German Administration Court delivered its judgment and it was 
decided that Facebook fan operators are not regarded as data 
controllers as they are not responsible for the technical and legal 
aspects of Facebook. It is not clear whether the ULD will appeal 
against this decision, but it is likely to heighten tensions between the 
Data Protection Authorities of Germany and Ireland, and it is not 
clear why the German Court did not make a preliminary ruling 
reference directly to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) on this point as it raises a significant issue in terms of how 
the Data Protection Directive is applied.41  
Although the issue of social networking and the individual as a ‘data 
controller’ was not considered to any extent, these recent case 
developments serve as an example of the nature and complexity of 
SNSs in Germany and highlight the difficulties in terms of the 
practical application of data protection rules to an SNS located 
within the EU but outside the EU Member States.  
                                            
40 ibid. 
41 Many thanks for the Schleswig-Holstein Data Protection Authority (ULD) for 
guidance on this (on file with the author, dated 29 August 2014). See also John 
O’Connor, ‘German Court Ruling on Facebook’s Personal Data Gives Legal 
Certainty to Irish Data Controllers’ (Lexology, 12 September 2014) 
<www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a0fa6f1a-32b8-4bc4-b980-
ecf86a1d9eb9> accessed 14 November 2014; and ULD, ‘OVG Judgment on 
Facebook Fan Pages in Need of Revision’ (Datenschutz Zentrum, 29 September 
2014 <www.datenschutzzentrum.de/artikel/770-ULD-OVG-Urteil-zu-Facebook-
Fanpages-revisionsbeduerftig.html> accessed 14 November 2014.  
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Sweden 
The Swedish Personal Data Act 1998 governs the protection of 
personal data within Sweden and was recently amended in 2007 to 
include the misuse-orientated approach.42 This means that data that 
is unstructured would fall outside the scope of the Swedish Personal 
Data Act. The guidelines provided by the Swedish data inspectorate 
provide that processing of data in unstructured material such as 
email messages or texts published on the internet would be exempted 
and should not offend individuals (‘violation of the integrity’ of the 
individual), such as breaching confidentiality, defaming an individual 
or compiling information about an individual for no specific 
reason.43 As this is exempted in Sweden, it is different from the EU 
approach on Data Protection whereby all forms of data processing 
fall within the scope of the Data Protection Directive unless the 
exemptions under Art. 3(2) processing (for private household 
purposes) or Art. 9 (artistic, journalistic and literary requirements) 
apply.44 It further decriminalises breaches of data security through 
mere negligence, though gross negligence could still fall within the 
Swedish Personal Data Act. 
Swedish Study into Social Networking 2011 
The Swedish Data Inspectorate Board carried out a study on social 
networking sites in 2011, primarily focusing on young people’s 
attitudes towards privacy. The sample group included youth between 
the ages of 15-18 (N=522).45 What follows is a summary of some of 
                                            
42 Swedish Personal Data Act Amendments 2007, SFS 2006:398. 
43 Swedish Data Inspectorate, Personal Data Protection (4th revised edn, Swedish 
Ministry of Justice 2006) 14 
<www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/07/43/63/0ea2c0eb.pdf> accessed 14 November 
2014. 
44 For a background into the misuse-orientated approach, see Sören Öman, ‘Trends 
in Data Protection Law’ (2010) 56 Scandinavian Studies in Law 209, 
<www.sorenoman.se/documents/2769.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014. 
45 Kairos Future/Swedish Data Inspection Board, ‘Young People and Privacy 2011’ 
(Swedish Data Inspection Board, January 2011) 
<www.datainspektionen.se/Documents/rapport-young-people-and-privacy-
2011.pdf> accessed 26 August 2014. 
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the findings. Given the limited nature of this paper, only the salient 
points on social networking are considered.46 The study found that 
more and more young people were using SNSs and the most widely 
used was Facebook.47  
The information that young people considered ‘private’ included, but 
were not limited to: who they were ‘in love with’, their personal 
finances and where they lived. Political opinion and religious beliefs 
were thought to be less sensitive.48 Similarly, information about 
which school they attended, or the town or country they came from, 
were less sensitive. In 2010, over 90% surveyed had posted photos 
of themselves online, almost 50% had uploaded videos of themselves 
and almost 90% had written comments about themselves with their 
names attached. In terms of awareness, over 60% surveyed had 
thought about privacy issues and how they handle private 
information and approximately 40% avoided writing certain things 
online that would cause problems later in life.49  
                                            
46 Please note that the author does not represent the views of the Swedish Data 
Protection Inspectorate Board and the results are used in the context of this study 
into social networking and the application of the Data Protection Directive and 
relevant data protection laws. 
47 Swedish Data Inspection Board (n 43) 3. 
48 ibid. 
49 Ibid 7. 
Birkbeck Law Review Volume 2(2) 
  
 
332 
 
Figure 1: Risky behaviour on the internet 
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Figure 2: Awareness of privacy issues 
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Figure 3: Most used Social Networks 
In terms of the most frequent use of SNSs, 92% surveyed were using 
Facebook more than once a week, whilst 75% were using Youtube.50  
                                            
50 ibid 10. 
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Figure 4: Negative experiences online 
In terms of negative experiences online, the survey found that the 
most common offensive behaviour was writing unkind things about 
each other on the internet. About 56% surveyed had experienced 
this. About half who were surveyed had experienced ‘Facebook rape’ 
where their Facebook had been hijacked by someone writing entries 
on their Facebook, whether harmless or not.51 
                                            
51 Ibid 17. 
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In terms of complaints procedure, 31% of complainants had 
ultimately won the removal of words, videos, and photos from the 
network, and 26% have had someone banned from the SNS.  
 
Figure 5: Complaints procedure 
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Figure 6: The private sphere for young people in 2010 
The overall conclusion from the study was that although the sample 
was small, young people were presented with new communication 
opportunities which challenged them in how they should share and 
access information.52  
                                            
52 ibid 23. To date, other than the 2011 study, there have not been any recent 
studies carried out on SNSs. 
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Facebook 
One significant development occurred in 2011, when the Nordic 
Data Protection Authority produced a case study into Facebook 
following a complaint made by the Norwegian Consumer Council.53 
This led to the Nordic Data Protection Authorities carrying out an 
investigation into the workings of Facebook, with specific focus on 
data protection issues. This is significant because the Swedish Data 
Inspection Board later submitted questions to Facebook, following 
the case study with the Nordic Data Protection Authority. The main 
findings from the study are as follows. 
The study found that the privacy policy and statement of rights and 
responsibilities were wide. The wording of the clauses were vague 
and difficult to understand and, in particular, when processing user’s 
IP addresses and tracking what web pages users see, they found that 
the scope of the policy did not result in effective outcomes. 
Additionally, the study found a lack of transparency regarding 
privacy procedures. For example, it was noted that by adding 
information to the personal profile, a user received an increase in 
customised adverts. 54  The use of social plugins generated more 
information about Facebook users when they are logged in and 
logged out and is relevant in the context of IP addresses. Information 
collected from non-users came from ‘friend finder’ and social 
plugins.55  
The results of the study, however, led to more questions from the 
Nordic Data Protection Authorities directed towards Facebook on 
how Facebook works.56 The questions focus on: who gains access or 
                                            
53 Atle Årnes, Jørgen Skorstad and Lars-Henrik Paarup Michelsen, ‘Social Network 
Services and Privacy: A Case Study of Facebook’ (Persónuvernd, 15 April 2011) 
<www.personuvernd.is/media/frettir/Microsoft-Word---11-00643-5-Part-I---
Rapport_Facebook_2011-_april-2011_.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014; and 
Out-Law News, ‘Norwegian Consumer Group Calls for Tighter Facebook 
Regulation’ (Out-Law News, 2 June 2010) <www.out-law.com/page-11073> 
accessed 14 November 2014. 
54 ibid 4 (Årnes, Skorstad and Michelsen). 
55 ibid.  
56 44 questions were raised to Facebook by the Nordic Data Protection Authorities 
(the Norwegian Data Inspectorate on behalf of: Norway, Sweden, Denmark 
(including the Faroe Islands), and Finland (including Åland)), see the Norwegian 
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collects personal information; what happens to the collection of 
personal data; what are the attitudes towards members’ privacy 
settings; how much control does Facebook allow its members to 
have over these settings; and to what extent do Facebook or third 
parties allow users to change or reset settings on their Facebook 
profile. Facebook replied by writing that the user’s name, email 
address and birth date were not public information and not shared 
with other business; however, an individual may grant access to the 
data when he or she added a third party application. When a person 
joins Facebook, his or her name, profile picture, networks, user ID 
and username are made publicly available and shared with Facebook 
trusted partners who have entered a contract with Facebook to 
provide instant personalisation services. No additional sharing of 
information in an indirect manner is provided.57 
Facebook also gave the following reply in relation to the posting of 
information. A user who posts information on their Facebook profile 
(‘wall’) determines the scope of the audience for that piece of 
information. The contents of some of the posts are used by Facebook 
in their advertising of other promotional products. Facebook 
expressly mentioned that it did not share the content of user wall 
posts with other businesses and that users chose to share the content 
when they added a third party application. Users would decide what 
information was to be added to his or her profile—beyond the basic 
information. All information that the user chooses to add helps 
target better advertisements. In essence, Facebook argued that what 
personal data and information is made public is a matter of personal 
choice—a choice made by the user of the account. Indeed, in its 
                                                                                                   
Data Protection Authority, ‘What Happens with Personal Information in 
Facebook’ (Norwegian Data Protection Authority, 18 January 2012) 
<www.datatilsynet.no/Global/english/Personal_information_Facebook.pdf> 
accessed 14 November 2014; and Norwegian Data Inspectorate, ‘Social Network 
Services and Privacy’ (Norwegian Data Protection Authority, 7 July 2011) 
<www.datatilsynet.no/Global/english/11_00643_5_Part_II_Questions_Facebook_D
PA.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014.  
57 Letter from Richard Allan, Facebook’s Director of Policy for Europe, Africa, and 
Middle East to Bjorn-Erik Thon, Director of the Data Inspectorate of Norway 
(September 2011) 
<www.datatilsynet.no/Global/english/Facebook_questions_answere2011.pdf> 
accessed 14 November 2014. 
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privacy policy, Facebook indicated that as this was a free service 
covering over 750 million users, to keep the service free it would 
show advertisements to users. Users have a contract with Facebook 
Ireland as a ‘data controller’ for the purposes of the DPD.58  
On the question of IP addresses, Facebook adds that an impression 
log is created for all visits to a webpage. Facebook’s policy would be 
to delete unique impression logs after 90 days. Facebook does not 
consider 90 days to be excessive and argues that such practices are in 
line with that of other websites. For instances, Facebook noted that 
they temporarily store unique impression logs which include IP 
addresses. The purpose of temporarily storing the impression logs, 
including IP addresses, is to monitor the technical performance of 
the ‘like’ button and to detect problems across particular networks. 
Facebook uses IP addresses to investigate security threats such as a 
denial of services attack. Facebook further adds that it does not 
automatically tag photos and that a user could disable the tagging 
feature on their privacy settings if he or she preferred. 
Following the response, the details of Facebook were conveyed to 
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner to consider, as Facebook 
headquarters are based in Ireland and, therefore, Irish data 
protection laws apply. A response by the Norwegian Data Protection 
Authority was later written to the Consumer Council following their 
complaint.59  
In a recent Norwegian case, a shopkeeper who had been recently 
robbed published on Facebook video surveillance footage of those 
who had committed the crime. The Norwegian Data Protection 
Authority considered this to be a violation of the Norwegian Data 
Protection Act and fined the shopkeeper. This received widespread 
coverage in the Norwegian Press.60 
A second case concerned the publication of pictures and comments 
by an individual on Facebook. The issue centred on the right to 
speak freely on the internet and privacy. The Norwegian Data 
                                            
58 ibid. 
59 Grateful acknowledgements to the Norwegian Data Protection Authority for this 
information (on file with author, 27 August 2014). 
60 ibid. Case ref: 14/00538. 
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Protection Authority took the view that this was not a case of free 
speech and recommended that the data subject use ‘delete me’ for 
help or information to be deleted.61 
In Sweden, the data inspectorate carried out a series of audits on 
Swedish organisations on the collection of personal information 
through Facebook.62 Although this was not concerned with the 
processing operations of Facebook, the Swedish Data Inspectorate 
Board has since issued guidelines when processing personal 
information in Sweden.63 
The developments that have emerged are similar to the German 
approach in terms of the application of the Nordic laws (if any) to 
SNSs. Whilst the DPD is expressly clear about Art. 4(1)(a) and the 
need for an ‘establishment’ before the data protection laws apply to 
the data controller, the approach from the Swedish Data 
Inspectorate is more focussed on the protection of the ‘integrity’ of 
the individual and, unless the data causes harm to the individual 
(misuse-orientated approach), the data protection laws do not apply.  
                                            
61 Case ref: 14/00888. See also ‘Delete Me’ website at <https://slettmeg.no> accessed 
14 November, which was originally an initiative by the Norwegian Data Protection 
Authority and then moved to NorSIS <www.norsis.no> accessed 14 November 
2014. According to the website, ‘Slettmeg.no offers advice and guidance to people 
of all ages who find offending material about themselves on the internet. Offending 
material might be photos published without permission, fake profiles on different 
internet services, incorrect personal information or harassment. People who have 
published this information themselves, but regret it and want this information 
removed, may also get in touch with slettmeg.no for support.’ Grateful 
acknowledgements to the Norwegian Data Protection Authority for this 
information (on file with the author, 27 August 2014). 
62 Årnes, Skorstad and Michelsen (n 53) 34. 
63 Swedish Data Inspection Board, ‘Datainspektionen Granskar hur Facebook 
Anvands [Data Inspectorate Examines how Facebook is Used]’ (Swedish Data 
Inspection Board, 26 March 2013) 
<www.datainspektionen.se/press/nyheter/2013/datainspektionen-granskar-hur-
facebook-anvands/> accessed 14 November 2014; and ‘Personuppgifter I Sociala 
Medier [Personal Information in Social Media]’ (Swedish Data Inspection Board, 
May 2014) <www.datainspektionen.se/Documents/faktablad-sociala-medier.pdf> 
accessed 26 August 2014. See also Swedish Data Inspection Board, ‘Frivilligt 
Integritets Skydd pa Internet [Voluntary Protection of Privacy on the Internet]’ 
(Swedish Data Inspection Board, 1999) 
<http://bestall.datainspektionen.se/rapporter/frivilligt-integritetsskydd-pa-internet-
beskrivning> accessed 26 August 2014. 
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Following a query to the Swedish Data Inspectorate, the author 
found that there was no record of statistics made on the number of 
complaints against Facebook, Google and other SNS. There is one 
case where an individual had posted naked pictures of other 
individuals on Instagram and this was reported to the Swedish Data 
Inspectorate leading to court action and resulted in fines to the 
individual. 64  Otherwise, there have been very few cases on the 
individual as a ‘data controller’. 
The studies carried out by the Swedish Data Inspectorate show 
increasing awareness of young people towards SNSs, particularly on 
the harmful effects that could result from putting information online. 
Although the study was carried out in 2011, it remains to be seen 
whether the mechanisms of the Swedish Personal Data Act and 
technical mechanisms online via internet browsers can safely protect 
users’ personal information.  
Google and the Right to be Forgotten 
The key issue is to consider the extent to which individuals can erase 
data held on a public profile online, so whilst the recent CJEU’s 
judgment deals with Google, it would be useful to see how this may 
apply to ‘people search engines’ that hold profiles of individuals 
publicly.  
Whilst the principle of the right to be forgotten has received 
widespread academic attention—in regard to the applicability of the 
principle and how it will work in practice—the judgment dating 
back to May 2014 not only clarifies the application of the DPD to 
the internet, but the extent to which online users could request that 
information about themselves is removed.65  
                                            
64 Many thanks to the Swedish Data Inspectorate Authority for this information (on 
file with the author, 29 August 2014). 
65 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD) (OJ C 212/4, 13 May 2014). See elsewhere in this issue: Gloria 
González Fuster, ‘Fighting for Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case 
Law of the EU Court of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection’ (2014) 
2(2) Birkbeck Law Review 263. See also Meg Leta Ambrose, ‘It’s About Time: 
Privacy, Information Cycles and the Right to be Forgotten’ (2013) 16 Stanford 
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By way of background, the applicant brought legal action against 
Google, requesting that search engine results about him from two 
printed issues in 1998 be removed.66 One indicated that his property 
had been repossessed. The question on the application of the DPD to 
the internet was referred to the CJEU in an Art. 267 preliminary 
ruling reference by the Spanish Court. The CJEU gave its 
interpretation in May 2014. It held that the search engine operator 
had ‘collected’ data within Art. 2(b) of the DPD. The operator had 
‘retrieved’, ‘recorded’ and ‘organised’ the data in question. 
Furthermore, the CJEU held that the operator was a ‘data controller’ 
within Art. 2(d) of the DPD and that it had to comply with the 
requirements with the DPD. As Google Spain was a subsidiary of 
Google Inc., on Spanish territory, it fell within the definition of an 
‘establishment’ within Art. 4(1)(a). It was further noted that the right 
to be forgotten was not absolute and that it had to be balanced 
against other fundamental rights such as freedom of expression. 
What was interesting about the judgement was the responsibility of 
the search engine where it was held to be required to remove links to 
a web page published by third parties which contained information 
of a person from a list of results that were displayed after a search 
was made against a person’s name online. The implications of this 
judgment are significant because they impose far-reaching 
implications—consequences for the extent to which information 
displayed by a search engine could or could not be accessible. 
Following the judgement, Google received more than 12,000 
requests to remove links within 24 hours.67 As this judgement was 
                                                                                                   
Technology Law Review 369; Jonathan Zittrain, ‘Don’t Force Google to “Forget”’ 
The New York Times (New York, 14 May 2014) 
<www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html?_r=0#> 
accessed 14 November 2014; Jef Ausloos, ‘The “Right to be Forgotten”—Worth 
Remembering?’ (2012) 28(2) CLSR 143; Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Forgetting Footprints, 
Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the “Right to be Forgotten” in Big Data 
Practice’ (2011) 8(3) SCRIPT 229; Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, ‘Oblivion: 
The Right to be Different from Oneself—Reproposing the Right to be Forgotten’ (1 
February 2012) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033155> 
accessed 14 November 2014. 
66 ibid (Google). 
67 Samuel Gibbs, ‘Google Hauled in by Europe over “Right to be Forgotten” 
Reaction’ The Guardian (London, 24 July 2014) 
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likely to impact other search engines, Yahoo and Microsoft both 
indicated that they were reviewing their policies on displaying search 
engine results following the CJEU judgment.68 
Recently, the United Kingdom House of Lords EU sub-committee 
has indicated that the CJEU judgement on Google was wrong and 
that the new Data Protection Regulation needed to invalidate the 
CJEU judgment. The House of Lords EU sub-committee took the 
view that the judgment was flawed. According to Baroness Prashar, 
‘we do not believe that individuals should have a right to have links 
to accurate and lawfully available information about them removed, 
simply because they do not like what is said.’ 69  In its overall 
conclusion, the House of Lords Sub-committee took the view that 
the 1995 Directive and the CJEU’s interpretation of the Directive 
‘reflected the current state of communications where global access to 
detailed personal information had become part of the way of life.’70 
It was not reasonable to allow data subjects to remove links to data 
where this was accurate or lawfully available. The right to be 
forgotten should be removed as it was misguided and unworkable in 
practice. The definition of a ‘data controller’ under the Data 
Protection Regulation needed to be amended to clarify that the term 
did not include ordinary users of search engines and that search 
engines should not be categorised as ‘data controllers’.71 
Whilst the CJEU has clarified the extent to which the DPD applies to 
search engines and precedes the Data Protection Regulation, the 
                                                                                                   
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/24/google-hauled-in-by-europe-over-
right-to-be-forgotten-reaction> accessed 14 November 2014. 
68 Sam Schechner, ‘Google Starts Removing Search Results under Europe’s Right to 
be Forgotten’ The Wall Street Journal (New York, 26 June 2014) 
<http://online.wsj.com/articles/google-starts-removing-search-results-under-
europes-right-to-be-forgotten-1403774023> accessed 14 November 2014. 
69 Liat Clark, ‘Lords: Right to be Forgotten is Wrong, Unworkable and 
Unreasonable (Wired, 31 July 2014) <www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-
07/30/right-to-be-forgotten-is-wrong> accessed 14 November 2014. See also House 
of Lords European Union Committee, EU Data Protection Law: A Right to be 
Forgotten? (HL 2014-15, 40) 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/40/40.pdf> 
accessed 14 November 2014. 
70 ibid paras 60-65. 
71 ibid. 
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repercussions of this judgment are likely to impact search engine 
results where data can be easily displayed against the search of a 
name and linked to information to the individual if it is not accurate. 
It is not clear yet whether requests are likely to be made to search 
engines that are aimed at finding individuals, but the Google 
judgment is likely to be far-reaching and therefore the interpretation 
and application under the DPD and national data protection laws 
will be watched with much scrutiny by users and those likely to be 
affected by the CJEU judgment. 
In a separate action, Max Schrems, an Austrian lawyer, has brought 
a case against Facebook following the Irish Data Protection Com-
missioner’s investigation into Facebook. 72 This is a separate case and 
was commenced as the claimant did not completely agree with the 
previous outcomes reached by the Irish Data Protection Commis-
sioner on Facebook. The main complaint, however, is with Facebook 
and whether it transferred data to the US. Schrems contended that 
by ‘transferring user data to the United States, Facebook Ireland was 
facilitating the processing of such data by Facebook itself’ and that 
‘While Facebook has self-certified by reference to the Safe Harbour 
principles.’ Schrems further argued that there was ‘no meaningful 
protection in US law or practice in respect of data so transferred so 
far as  state surveillance was concerned.’ Further still, Schrems main-
tained that  
the US law enforcement agencies could obtain access to 
such data without the need for a court order, or, at least, a 
court order showing probable cause that a particular data 
subject had engaged in illegal activities or stood possessed 
                                            
72 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310; [2014] 3 CMLR 37 
(text freely available at <www.europe-v-facebook.org/hcj.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2014). See also The Guardian, ‘Lawyer Suing Facebook Overwhelmed 
with Support Available’ The Guardian (London, 6 August 2014) 
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/06/facebook-privacy-action-austria-
max-schrems> accessed 14 November 2014; and Bryan Cronan, ‘Facebook Sued by 
Law Student Max Schrems for Privacy Violations’ (The Christian Science Monitor, 
1 August 2014) <www.csmonitor.com/Business/2014/0801/Facebook-sued-by-law-
student-Max-Schrems-for-privacy-violations> accessed 14 November 2014. 
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of information which would be of genuine interest to law 
enforcement bodies.73 
In deciding the case, the Irish Court has referred certain questions to 
the CJEU. The main questions are as follows: 
Whether in the course of determining a complaint which 
has been made to an independent office holder who has 
been vested by statute with the functions of administering 
and enforcing data protection legislation that personal 
data is being transferred to another third country (in this 
case, the United States of America) the laws and practices 
of which, it is claimed, do not contain adequate 
protections for the data subject, that office holder is 
absolutely bound by the Community finding to the 
contrary contained in Commission Decision of 26 July 
2000 (2000/520/EC) having regard to Article 7 and Article 
8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (2000/C 364/01), the provisions of Article 25(6) of 
Directive 95/46/EC notwithstanding? Or, alternatively, 
may the office holder conduct his or her own investigation 
of the matter in the light of factual developments in the 
meantime since that Commission Decision was first 
published?74 
Although the judgment is likely to take at least another year before it 
is resolved, the High Court of Ireland was clear in noting that it was 
critical, when interpreting the DPD and the 2000 Commission 
decision on Safe Harbor, to re-examine this in the light of Art. 8 of 
the ECHR Charter and whether the 2000 Commission decision 
should be disregarded—which is why Art. 267 TFEU was crucial.75 
The implications of this case are likely to impact social networking 
and how information is held or transferred.  
                                            
73 ibid Schrems [29]. 
74 ibid [71]. 
75 Europe versus Facebook, ‘European Court of Justice will decide over 
Facebook/Prism’ (Europe versus Facebook, 18 June 2014) <www.europe-v-
facebook.org/PRISM_pa_en.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014. 
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Conclusion 
This paper began with an analysis of legal developments on SNSs 
since 2007 in the UK, Germany, Sweden and Norway (limited 
extent), and the application of Art. 3(2) of the DPD on private 
purposes and household exception. What can be identified is that 
there are different approaches adopted by the jurisdictions examined 
on the application of data protection rules to social media. This 
paper therefore contributed to the wider literature by considering the 
responses by the UK, German, Swedish and Norwegian Data 
Protection Authorities to recent developments.  
Take, for instance, the UK ICO’s profound disagreement with the 
scope of the forthcoming Data Protection Regulation and the CJEU’s 
decision in Lindqvist, whilst other jurisdictions such as Germany and 
Norway have had to consider whether the data protection rules 
apply to Facebook and whether users’ data were sufficiently 
protected. In Sweden, the attitudes of young people to social media 
in a recent study in 2011 revealed an increasing awareness amongst 
young people, but also challenges that these technologies presented 
on protecting privacy and how information is provided on social 
media sites. The legal remedies, however, still remain unclear. 
Furthermore, the approaches of different jurisdictions to the issue of 
data protection in social media are far from consistent.  
This is further complicated by the recent CJEU judgment on Google 
to allow users to erase data on Google search engine results, yet the 
application and implication of the CJEU’s judgment remains 
unclear.76  
What is needed is further reinforcement and guidance on a) 
application or non-application of data protection rules to social 
media, b) when the rights to erase data could apply to people search 
engines as well as search engine results in general, c) academic and 
practitioner discussion into data protection rules online beyond the 
discussion on the aspects of ‘privacy’, and d) discussion on the 
                                            
76 As is further discussed in Gloria González Fuster’s contribution to this issue. 
Gloria González Fuster, ‘Fighting for Your Right to What Exactly? The 
Convoluted Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data 
Protection’ (2014) 2(2) Birkbeck Law Review 263. 
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private and public spheres of social media and reasonable 
expectations for privacy online. 
The forthcoming Data Protection Regulation is likely to be passed in 
2015, if there are no further obstacles at EU level. The regulation 
would have to be applied uniformly and the renamed European Data 
Protection Board (ex Art. 29 Working Party) may need to revisit the 
guidelines it issued in 2009 on social media in light of the Data 
Protection Regulation to make clear when an SNS user could 
exercise their rights and have data removed without recourse to 
litigation which can be time-consuming and costly. Only then can 
there be confidence in the use of social media that respects the 
privacy rights of users.  
The case of Schrems77 is likely to propel the issue of social media 
into the spotlight and the CJEU’s judgment will bring further insight 
and clarity on how the data protection rules will apply to social 
media and whether the current DPD will provide sufficient legal 
remedies (other than the Data Protection Regulation) to address 
privacy issues online. The application of the DPD, the protection of 
the user’s privacy on social media is unlikely to go away and the aim 
of this paper is to raise awareness of how the legal developments 
have evolved since 2007 and consider what boundaries (if any) 
should be drawn to protect users’ expectation of privacy online. 
                                            
77 Schrems (n 72). 
